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ABSTRACT 
Exploring the Reliability and Validity of  
the Experiential Discounting Task 
by  
Rochelle R. Smits, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2012 
Major Professor: Dr. Gregory J. Madden 
Department: Psychology 
 
Delay discounting (the devaluation of rewards delayed in time) has been studied 
extensively using animal models with psychophysical adjustment procedures. Similar 
procedures were soon developed to assess delay discounting in humans. Although across 
species the same mathematical function relates discounted value to imposed delay, 
several methodological concerns have been implicated in human delay discounting 
procedures. A procedure recently developed to address these concerns is the Experiential 
Discounting Task (EDT). This task arranges experienced delays and rewards that humans 
make decisions regarding—experiencing the outcomes of their choices within session 
before making additional choices. The popularity of this procedure has been fueled by 
reports of its sensitivity to acute experimental manipulation, and that it has been 
predictive of treatment success. Similar sensitivity results have not been found when a 
traditional delay discounting task (DDT) has been used. Though the EDT appears useful 
iv 
 
for a variety of reasons, it has not been subjected to the same rigorous internal validity 
and reliability tests that traditional DDTs have. In two experiments we examined the test-
retest reliability of the EDT (Experiment 1) and the way in which choice trials are 
regulated (Experiment 2). Results demonstrate that the EDT is reliable across time and 
choice is insensitive to trial regulation differences. We conclude with a critique of the 
EDT as a procedure for assessing delay discounting and hypothesize other processes it 
may be measuring.  
 (80 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT  
Exploring the Reliability and Validity of  
the Experiential Discounting Task 
Rochelle R. Smits 
 
Delay discounting is the devaluation of rewards that are delayed in time. This 
phenomenon was first studied with animals in controlled laboratory environments and 
later translated to human procedures. Though the decrease in value of outcomes as the 
delay to receipt increases is the same across species (money for humans, food for 
animals), a number of methodological concerns have been raised about the procedures 
used to study delay discounting in humans.  
 
The Experiential Discounting Task (EDT) was recently developed in order to study delay 
discounting in humans in a way that is more similar to that used with animals. That is, 
humans make repeated decisions concerning outcomes they experience within session 
(delays and rewards). The EDT has proven useful for a variety of reasons including its 
ability to detect changes in how delayed rewards are discounted as a function of acute 
alcohol where traditional measures have not. However, this measure has yet to undergo 
rigorous tests of internal validity and reliability that previous measures of delay 
discounting have.  
 
In two experiments we tested the reliability and internal validity of the EDT. First we 
assessed the test-retest reliability across seven days. Next we tested whether the way in 
which choices are presented in the EDT affects choice. In addition, all participants 
completed a traditional delay discounting task, boredom proneness scale and probability 
discounting task.  
 
Experiment 1 resulted in good test-retest reliability for all tasks, including the EDT and 
the traditional measure of delay discounting. In Experiment 2 we found that individual 
performance did not change as a function of how choices were presented. Across both 
experiments we found no evidence for a correlation between discounting in the EDT and 
the traditional measure. Though reliable across time we contend, based on the relation to 
a traditional delay discounting task and the reviewed literature that there is little evidence 
that the EDT is a valid measure of delay discounting and call for more research to 
determine what process underlies decision-making in the EDT.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Delay discounting is the systematic decrease in the subjective value of an 
outcome as the delay to its receipt increases (for review see Madden & Bickel, 2010). 
Delay discounting is thought to underlie a specific type of impulsivity (Ainslie, 1975) – 
one characterized by preference for a smaller-sooner (SS) reward over an objectively 
larger but delayed reward with a present (discounted) value below that of the SS reward. 
For example, pay-day loan services profit from those who choose to obtain a small 
amount of cash now (SS) over a larger amount of money dispersed later (LL) when the 
next paycheck arrives. The choice provides evidence that the value of the LL payment is 
discounted below the undiscounted value of immediate cash.  
Review of Delay Discounting 
The seminal work in delay discounting was conducted in nonhuman animal labs 
and used titrating procedures borrowed from psychophysics (e.g., Mazur, 1987). In these 
studies, the shape and steepness of the delay discounting function were investigated by 
giving animals (such as rats or pigeons) repeated choices between SS and LL amounts of 
food at a range of delays. At each delay, the animal’s choices were used to quantify the 
subjective (discounted) value of the LL reward. One commonly used method for 
accomplishing this is to make choice-dependent adjustments to the amount of the 
immediate reward until the animal is indifferent between the LL and SS rewards (e.g., 
Green, Myerson & Calvert, 2010; Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997). Figure 1 
shows two hyperbolic discounting functions that well characterize animal choices under 
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this procedure. The steepness of the curve reflects the rate at which delayed rewards are 
discounted and is quantified as the k-parameter in the hyperbolic discounting equation 
proposed by Mazur (1987): 
      
 
      
                 (1) 
where V is the present value of a reward of amount (A), available after a delay (D). 
Higher k values reflect steeper discounting as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Two illustrative discounting curves.  
In the last 20 years, a considerable amount of research has explored variants of 
these methods to examine the shape and steepness of the delay discounting function in 
humans. Most of these studies employ hypothetical monetary outcomes and an adjusting-
amount procedure similar to the one described above (e.g., Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 
1991). The vast majority of research suggests that Equation 1 provides a better fit of 
human delay discounting than does a normative exponential equation that was favored by 
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economists for a majority of the 20
th
 century (Samuelson, 1937).
1
 This finding suggests 
that a comparable behavioral/cognitive process underlies human and animal discounting 
of delayed rewards.   
That being said, four concerns have often been raised about the procedures used 
to study delay discounting in humans: a) the vast majority, if not all, of the rewards used 
in these studies are hypothetical prospects rather than real consequences of choice 
(Lawyer, Schoepflin, Green, & Jenks, 2011), b) the delays to the LL reward are verbal 
descriptions of delays rather than real delays that will be experienced (Lagorio & 
Madden, 2005), c) steady-state procedures characterizing the animal literature are not 
used with humans (Lagorio & Madden, 2005), and d) variables that would appear to 
affect impulsive decision-making in natural environments (e.g., opportunity costs, 
probabilistic delayed outcomes) are not represented in these discounting tasks (Reynolds, 
2006).  
Each of these concerns appears to have motivated the development of the 
Experiential Discounting Task (EDT) as an alternative method of assessing human delay 
discounting (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004). In the EDT, humans make choices 
involving real SS and LL rewards and real delays to their delivery. The EDT uses an 
adjusting amount procedure similar to that used with nonhumans; that is, the amount of 
the SS reward is incremented (decremented) on trial ti+1 after this alternative was chosen 
(forgone) on trial ti. Monetary rewards, and delays to these rewards, are experienced for 
each choice made in the EDT and before additional choices are made. Finally, choices 
                                                 
1
 See Green & Myerson (2004) for evidence that a hyperbola-like equation provides a better fit to human, 
but not animal delay discounting data. 
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continue to be made at a single delay until a stable pattern of decision making is detected 
(Reynolds, Penfold, & Patak, 2008; Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Shiels et al., 
2009; Voon et al., 2010). An attractive feature of the EDT is that multiple indifference 
points are obtained in a single session; making it possible to derive a k-value in 
approximately 20 minutes. Thus, the procedure appears ideal when studying experimental 
manipulations anticipated to produce time-limited effects on delay discounting (e.g., 
sleep deprivation or drugs; Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004; Voon et al., 2010).  
A second apparent benefit of the EDT is that choice under this procedure is 
sensitive to acute experimental manipulations, whereas choices made in discounting tasks 
using hypothetical rewards and delays are largely insensitive to these manipulations (see 
review by de Wit & Mitchell, 2010). For example, Reynolds et al. (2006) found that 
alcohol consumption increased the steepness of delay discounting curves when these 
curves were assessed with the EDT, whereas choice in a hypothetical-rewards delay 
discounting task was unaffected by alcohol (see also Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de 
Wit,  1999). Choices made in the EDT have also proven sensitive to sleep deprivation 
(Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004); the dopamine D2/D3 agonist, pramipexole (Voon et al., 
2010); and, methylphenidate in children diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Shiels et al., 2009). This point is illustrated in Table 1 which summarizes effect 
sizes from the small number of studies that have used both the EDT and a delay 
discounting task (DDT). An effect size is a standardized mean difference between 
experimental and control group/condition; positive effect sizes indicate that the 
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experimental manipulation increased impulsivity. Table 1 illustrates that the EDT has 
produced larger effect sizes than the DDT (Mann-Whitney U = 3.5, p < .05).  
Table 1 
 
EDT and DDT Effect Size Comparison for Studies that Evaluated Experimental 
Manipulations  
 
     EDT   DDT   
 
Acheson et al. (2006)                    
 Diazepam       0    0 
 
Acheson et al. (2007)            
 Sleep Deprivation      .27  -.55 
 
Reynolds et al. (2006) 
 High dose alcohol  18.33   .01      
 Low dose alcohol    1.67   .05   
 
Shiels et al. (2009) 
 High dose MPH      .31    0   
 Low dose MPH      .25    0   
 
 
Another benefit of the EDT is that at least one study suggests it better 
differentiates those who will succeed in drug-treatment from those who will not. 
Krishnan-Sarin et al. (2007) reported that adolescent smokers who discounted less steeply 
in the EDT were more likely to be abstinent at the end of a smoking-cessation treatment 
interval. A hypothetical-rewards DDT failed to differentiate between these treatment-
seeking smokers.  
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Because the EDT has proven to be convenient, sensitive to acute experimental 
manipulations, predictive of a treatment outcome, and differentiates addicted from 
control samples (Fields, Collins, Leraas, & Reynolds, 2009; Reynolds, 2006) the EDT (or 
a similar procedure) has been used as a measure of delay discounting in several research 
laboratories in the US and UK. 
Unique Characteristics of the EDT 
The EDT contains three procedural components that differ from commonly used 
DDTs. To better understand the apparent benefits of the EDT, we describe and consider 
the pros and cons of each of these unique procedural characteristics in the sections that 
follow. 
Delayed-Probabilistic Rewards  
Reynolds (2006) noted that in extra-laboratory contexts delayed rewards are often 
probabilistic. For example, when a trusted friend asks to borrow $100 to be paid back in 
one year, one knows that the probability of receiving nothing in return is greater than 
zero. Likewise, in the natural environment of nonhumans, delayed rewards may never 
come to fruition if any of a number of interruptions comes to pass (Stevens & Stephens, 
2010). For example, the LL reward may be consumed by a conspecific or the organism 
awaiting the LL may be consumed by a predator. To model this, following the delay 
interval, the EDT delivers the LL reward with a probability of .35. 
Introducing probabilistic outcomes in a discounting task is potentially problematic 
if one is interested in quantifying delay discounting. To address this, Reynolds and 
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Schiffbauer (2004) suggested that the probabilistic-reward effect could be removed from 
EDT measures of delay discounting through a normalization procedure. Specifically, in 
one condition of the EDT participants choose between a smaller-certain and a larger-
probabilistic reward (p = .35). The subjective value of the probabilistic reward (i.e., the 
indifference point) in this condition is then used as the normalized value of the 
probabilistic LL rewards arranged in the other EDT conditions.  
The EDT’s normalization technique assumes that the effect of probability on 
reward value is constant across the range of delays arranged in the EDT (0-60 s). Such an 
assumption is consistent with the hypothesis that delay- and probability-discounting are a 
single process. For example, Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, and Frankel (1986) suggested that 
delay discounting is the fundamental process underlying probability discounting because 
decreasing the probability of obtaining a reward in a repeated gambles experiment 
increases the average delay to collection (see also Rachlin et al., 1991). Consistent with 
this, Yi, Piedad, and Bickel (2006) found that a single hyperbolic discounting function 
could be fit to indifference points when the rewards were both delayed and probabilistic. 
However, the delays employed in the Yi et al., experiment were not within the range of 
delays arranged in the EDT and the Yi et al., delays and probabilities (and rewards) were 
hypothetical rather than experienced, as they are in the EDT. Thus, the assumption that 
using a probabilistic LL reward in the EDT does not affect the estimate of delay 
discounting has not yet been established. Because a considerable amount of evidence 
suggests that delay and probability discounting are separate processes (Estle, Green, 
Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Myerson, Green, & 
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Morris, 2011; Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998) there is reason to question this 
assumption.  
Opportunity Costs  
Reynolds (2006) argued that outside the laboratory, choosing a LL reward often 
involves opportunity costs; that is, time spent waiting for the LL reward is time in which 
other (SS) rewards may not be pursued. For example, amusement park rides differ in 
quality and in the time that must be spent waiting in line to access the ride. If one is 
waiting in a long line, the opportunity cost is the cumulative benefits that could have been 
obtained by riding several lower quality rides. To model these costs, sequential choices in 
the EDT are not separated by a post-reward ITI. Thus, participants may obtain several SS 
rewards in the period required to obtain a single LL reward. 
If the EDT is being used as a tool to quantify delay discounting (e.g., Krishnan-
Sarin et al., 2007) then omitting the ITI may raise concerns. When real rewards and real 
delays are employed in non-EDT studies of delay discounting (most of which involve 
animals and food rewards), a post-reward ITI is almost always programmed (e.g., 
Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Mazur, 1988; Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997). The 
duration of the ITI in these experiments is dynamic such that the interval between choice 
opportunities is constant regardless of the alternative chosen. If the ITI were omitted, 
then the organism could select and obtain several SS rewards in the time it takes to obtain 
a single LL reward. Such choices could not be described as ―impulsive‖ (i.e., a 
maladaptive choice) if they allow the organism to maximize local and overall rates of 
reward (Logue, Peña-Correal, Rodriguez, & Kabela, 1986).  
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Omitting ITI’s complicates estimation of the discounted value of the LL reward. 
In a nonhuman DDT, when the organism is indifferent between a single SS and a LL 
reward, the value of the latter is the former. However, if multiple SS rewards are obtained 
during the delay (as in the EDT), then at indifference how should the discounted value of 
the LL reward be quantified? It might be the sum the SS rewards or the sum of the 
discounted values of each SS reward in the sequence separating LL rewards (Mazur, 
1986). The EDT takes neither approach. Instead, the average SS reward value over the 
last six choices is taken as the discounted value of the LL reward.  
Omitting ITIs may also have the unintended effect of allowing participants to end 
more quickly the portion of the EDT that requires sustained attention. EDT sessions are 
composed of several trial-blocks with a different delay to the LL reward arranged in each. 
The duration of each trial block allows for 20 LL choices to be completed. If fewer than 
20 LL choices have been made when the stability criterion is met, then the remainder of 
the trial block is spent in a waiting period until the next trial block begins. Under this 
arrangement, each SS choice shortens the portion of the session in which participants are 
required to pay attention to the task. Given that humans often find operant tasks boring 
(Galizio & Buskist, 1988), this escape contingency may increase the probability of SS 
choices and contaminate the quantification of delay discounting.  Consistent with this 
hypothesis, children made more LL choices when an ITI was programmed than when it 
was omitted in an EDT-like procedure in which LL rewards were obtained 100% of the 
time (Scheres et al., 2006). If this escape contingency increases SS choices, and escape 
from an attention-demanding task is a more powerful reinforcer when the participant is 
10 
 
sleep deprived or intoxicated (Reynolds et al., 2006; Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004) then 
the steeper EDT discounting functions reported by Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004) and 
Reynolds et al. (2006), respectively, may have more to do with escape-maintained 
behavior than to greater impulsive choice.  
Point-Delays 
 Unlike animal studies of delay discounting that involve real delays to real 
consumable rewards, the EDT arranges real rewards to real monetary allocations. A 
difference between these reward types is that the consumable reward mildly alleviates the 
animal’s state of deprivation, whereas the monetary allocation cannot be spent within the 
EDT session to alleviate a present need. Hyten, Madden, and Field (1994) referred to the 
delay to a non-consumable reward as a ―point delay.‖ Hyten et al. reported that humans 
exclusively preferred the LL monetary reward when point delays were in the range used 
in the EDT (see also Belke, Pierce, & Powell, 1989; Flora & Pavlik, 1992; Hyten et al., 
1994; Logue, King, Chavarro, & Volpe, 1990; Logue et al., 1986). From the participant’s 
perspective, if the SS reward is selected, it is obtained immediately but it cannot be spent 
until the session ends and the participant travels to an outlet where goods and services are 
sold. If the LL reward is selected, more money is obtained and the delay to spending the 
money on something that may be consumed is the same. When Jackson and Hackenberg 
(1996) arranged point delays to food rewards, pigeons strongly preferred the LL reward 
(see also Hackenberg & Vaidya, 2003). These findings suggest that humans should 
exclusively prefer the LL alternative under the point-delays arranged in the EDT.  
11 
 
Why humans appear to discount monetary rewards across point delays arranged in 
the EDT is unclear. Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004) suggested that arranging 
probabilistic rewards engenders delay discounting when point delays are arranged. 
However, the normalization process discussed above was supposed to subtract the effects 
of reward probability from measures of delay discounting. This inconsistency led us to 
question if the EDT measures delay discounting (as suggested by Reynolds & 
Schiffbeaur, 2004 and Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007) or a separate, and potentially 
important process.  
Does the EDT Assess Delay Discounting? A Literature Review 
To objectively evaluate the EDT literature we conducted a systematic review of 
the methods and results of all the studies that have used the EDT. All peer reviewed 
articles, published prior to December, 2011 that have used the EDT as described by 
Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004) were found via citation webs using ISI Web of Science 
and Google Scholar. Tables 2 and 3 show the 13 articles identified. Each study was 
evaluated according to several variables we deemed important in assessing trends in 
methodology and results in the EDT literature. Cohen’s d effect sizes were calculated for 
all studies using means and standard deviations or the reported statistics (Cohen, 1988). 
In assessment of whether the EDT assesses delay discounting we will consider 
four categories of data presented in Tables 2 and 3. First, and most obvious, measures of 
delay discounting obtained from the EDT should be positively correlated with measures 
obtained from other well-established DDTs. As shown in the final column of Tables 2 
and 3, seven studies reported correlation data, with two reporting  significant positive 
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correlations (Reynolds, 2006, r = .52; Reynolds et al., 2008, r = .26) and five reporting 
no significant correlation. These findings suggest the EDT does not provide a valid 
measure of delay discounting.  
Second, if the EDT provides a valid measure of delay discounting, then when 
indifference points are plotted against the range of point delays at which they are assessed 
in the EDT, Equation 1 should provide a good fit of these data. Of the 13 EDT studies 
published to date, 5 have reported how well Equation 1 (or any other equation) has fit the 
obtained indifference points. Across these five studies the average R
2
 value was .79; a 
value lower than typically reported with either nonhuman (e.g., R
2
 = .98, Richards et al., 
1997) or human subjects (e.g., R
2
 > .85, Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; median R
2
 = 
.915, Richards et al., 1999; see also DDT R
2 
column in Table 2). When interpreting these 
R
2
 values it is important to consider the proportion of participants excluded because of 
unsystematic data. In the five EDT studies that reported R
2
 values, three excluded 
between 12.5 and 40% of the participants because of unsystematic data. This is surprising 
considering it is rare for researchers to report excluded data from discounting 
experiments (e.g., Epstein, Richards, Saad, Paluch, & Roemmich, 2003; Richards et al., 
1999). Thus, on this second category by which the validity of the task may be evaluated, 
the evidence does not strongly support the position that the EDT measures the same delay 
discounting as other DDTs.  
 Table 2 
 
Summary of EDT Studies That Have Examined an Experimental Manipulation 
 
  
Study Subjects Independent Variable
Time between 
assessments
EDT Exclusion 
Criteria
Percent (n) 
excluded
EDT R
2   
M (SD)
DDT R
2         
M (SD)
EDT Effect 
Size
DDT      
Effect Size
EDT/DDT 
Correlation
Acheson et al. (2006) 18 community 
(18-45y)
Diazepam (20 mg) > 1 week        
(random order)
.75 (.06) .8 (.23) 0 0
Acheson et al. (2007) 20 community 
(18-45y)
Sleep deprivation 1 week 
(counterbalanced)
"poor fits" in both 
sessions
40% (8) .7 (.45) .5  (1.19) 0.27 -0.55
Reynolds et al. (2006) 24 community 
(av 25 y)
Alcohol > 1 week 
(counterbalanced)
k  not determined 12.5% (9) .71 (.2) .83 (.188) NS (rho)
a
High Dose (.4 g/kg) 18.33
b 0.01
Low Dose (.8 g/kg) 1.67 0.04
Reynolds & Schiffbauer 
(2004)
12 
undergraduates 
(18-23 y)
Sleep deprivation 1 week 
(counterbalanced)
EDT R
2
 < .30 27 % (3) .68 (.24) 0.65
b
Shiels et al. (2009)
c 49 children with 
ADHD (9-12 y)
Methylphenidate 24 hrs (random 
order)
NS
a
High Dose (Av 39mg) 0.31
b 0
Low Dose (Av 73 mg) 0.25
b 0
Voon et al. (2010) 44 NIH clinic 
(with 
parkinsons, and 
with ICD)
Dopamine agonist (161, 
155 LEDD mg/day)
> 1 week .7 (.25) 0.92
b
c
 Modified Barkley et al. (2001)
LEDD = L-Dopa Equivalent Daily Dose.
a 
Statistics not reported.
b  Statistically significant difference according to reported inferential statistics.
A dash indicates that the data were not reported. Except where otherwise specified, when a delay discounting task was used it was that described by Richards et al. (1999)
1
3
 
  Table 3 
 
Summary EDT Studies That Have Examined Group Differences   
 
1
4
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Third, an extensive body of research has demonstrated that substance-dependent 
individuals tend to more steeply discount delayed monetary rewards than matched 
controls (see MacKillop, Amlung, Few, Ray, Sweet, & Munafò, 2011 for a review). If the 
EDT measures delay discounting, then we would expect it to differentiate these 
populations in the same direction and by the same magnitude (i.e., co-variance of effect 
size). Those studies for which co-variance may be assessed are those in which substance 
dependent and matched control groups completed the EDT and the DDT (Table 2). For 
ease of comparison, effects sizes are displayed in Table 4. There is no clear relation 
between the effect sizes of the two measures across these experiments. Additional data 
are required to make a more definitive statement in either direction.  
 
 
Table 4 
 
EDT and DDT Effect Size Comparison for Group Differences  
 
 
     EDT   DDT   
 
Krishnan-Sarin et al. (2007)  5.00  -1   
 
Melanko et al. (2009)     .53  .44     
 
Paloyelis et al. (2010)     .32  .61    
 
Finally, traditional measures of delay discounting used with humans suggest that 
discounting rate is stable across retesting intervals ranging from 1 week to 1 year (Kirby, 
2009; Ohmura, Takahashi, Kitamura, & Wehr, 2006; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000). If the 
EDT provides a valid measure of delay discounting then one would expect EDT 
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outcomes to be similarly stable over time.  To date, only one study has assessed the test-
retest reliability of the EDT. Acheson, Richards, and de Wit (2007) asked 20 community 
members to complete the EDT in the morning and return to the lab approximately 10 
hours later to complete it again. No significant difference in rate of discounting was 
detected. Clearly, the test-retest validity of the EDT must be assessed across longer 
intervening periods so as to decrease concerns that participants’ choices during the 
afternoon EDT session were influenced by choices made in the morning.  
In sum, these four categories of data provide very limited support for the EDT as 
a valid measure of delay discounting. The correlation between traditional delay-
discounting task performance and discounting under the EDT is most often not observed. 
EDT indifference points are not as well described by Equation 1 as data from a 
hypothetical-reward DDT, and the co-variance of performance in the EDT and DDT by 
different populations has yet to be definitively established. Finally more data are needed 
to determine if EDT performance is reliable across time and repeated testing.  
So, What Does the EDT Measure? 
 Given the limited data for the EDT as a valid measure of delay discounting, are 
there reasons to continue using it? As noted above, the EDT appears to be more sensitive 
to acute experimental manipulations than is the DDT. Of course this is useful only if we 
understand what the EDT measures. In addition, a small literature suggests the EDT 
differentiates groups (Table 3) and, in at least one study, predicts treatment success 
(Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007). Should additional studies demonstrate that EDT 
performance is correlated with addictive behavior and success in treatment, a greater 
17 
 
premium would be placed on understanding what behavioral process is quantified by the 
EDT.  
One possibility is that the EDT provides a measure of sensitivity to delays 
involving opportunity costs (Reynolds, 2006). Most delay discounting tasks used with 
humans arrange long delays to hypothetical rewards (e.g., $100 in 1 year) and the 
participant is free to pursue other sources of the same reward during the delay. Human 
choice may be sensitive to the brief delays arranged in the EDT because these delays 
involve forgoing SS reward opportunities. Reynolds (2006) reported that participants 
who reported a stronger motivation to earn money were more likely to choose the SS 
reward; thereby suggesting a role for opportunity costs.  
A second, related possibility is that EDT choices may be affected by a 
participant’s willingness to tolerate a period devoid of stimulation (i.e., the delay to the 
LL reward). Individuals prone to boredom or less able to entertain themselves during 
stimulus-free periods may be more likely to choose the SS alternative. Likewise, a 
subject wishing to escape from the attention-demanding portion of the EDT session may 
learn that the waiting period that follows all choices made within a block of trials 
(leisure) may be produced more quickly by frequently choosing the SS reward.  
 A third possibility is that the EDT measures sensitivity to an internality of the task 
that some participants detect and exploit while others do not. Specifically, rewards on the 
LL alternative are probabilistic with an expected value less than 11 cents. Given this, 
participants should never choose the LL when the SS amount is above 11 cents. 
However, participants frequently do. This may reveal a strategy of exploiting the 
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internality – by repeatedly choosing the LL reward the SS amount is driven up. Detecting 
this, some participants may increase the SS amount to a value far higher than its 
discounted value so they may obtain a series of large-certain rewards. Heyman and Dunn 
(2002) arranged a procedure containing a similar internality. Choosing the right-now best 
alternative decreased overall income by gradually increasing the interval between choice 
opportunities, whereas choosing the worse right-now alternative had the opposite effect 
on inter-choice intervals. Heyman and Dunn reported that years of drug use was 
negatively correlated with global maximizing. Perhaps the EDT measures one’s ability to 
exploit the EDT’s internality and maximize total earnings. This may account for the 
correlation between steep EDT discounting (a failure to exploit the internality) and 
substance abuse. Likewise, acute experimental manipulations like intoxication or sleep 
deprivation may decrease one’s ability to exploit (or detect) the internality.   
Conclusion 
Delay discounting is of societal importance because of the relation between steep 
discounting and a variety of impulse-control disorders. There has been growing interest 
in the discounting community in an experiential task that is sensitive to acute changes in 
discounting and the EDT has, thus far, captured most of this attention. Since its 
development, the EDT has been used to study state changes (e.g., alcohol administration) 
as well as group differences (e.g., smokers v. nonsmokers) in rates of delay discounting 
in humans. A review of the EDT procedures and a critical examination of EDT and other 
discounting-task outcomes offers inadequate support for the validity of the EDT as a 
measure of delay discounting. Based on the extant use of the EDT as a measure of delay 
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discounting and the paucity of basic validation research, the current report investigated 
the reliability and validity of the EDT by assessing test-retest reliability, evaluating 
performance on several secondary measures (including a DDT), and evaluating the 
effects of the implementation of a choice-regulating delay (i.e., ITI).   
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Experiment 1: Test-Retest Reliability 
Participants 
 Twenty-nine undergraduate students and community members (18 female) 
participated in Experiment 1 (M = 21 years, SD = 2.9). Participants were recruited for the 
two 1-hour sessions (separated by 7 days) using the SONA recruiting website. 
Participants were compensated between $7 and $15 (amount dependent upon 
performance) for each session. Compensation was given following all behavioral and 
self-report tasks at the end of each session. All procedures were approved by the Utah 
State University Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
Procedure & Apparatus 
 Sessions were completed in a small room (113‖ x 79.5‖) containing two tables, 
one chair, and a desktop computer. Participants completed four different behavioral and 
self-report tasks in both sessions. Sessions began with either the Experiential Discounting 
Task (EDT) or the delay/probability discounting tasks (DDT/PDT); the order in which 
these tasks were completed was counterbalanced across participants and was the same 
across sessions. These tasks were completed on the computer using applications 
programmed in Visual Basic 2008. The remaining tasks were paper and pencil 
questionnaires and were completed in a fixed order: Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS) and 
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Monetary Motivation Scale (MMS). At the completion of the entire session participants 
were paid their EDT earnings in cash.  
Experiential Discounting Task (EDT). Prior to the EDT session, the 
experimenter read the instructions appearing in Appendix A. The experimenter remained 
in the room to provide standard answers (see Appendix B) to questions arising as the 
participant completed one practice trial block (ranging from 16 to 40 trials) for which 
they received no money. Each trial began with the screen display shown in Figure 2. 
Choices were made by pressing one of the on-screen light-bulb buttons. The alternative 
on the left is referred to as the standard alternative because it always arranged a $0.30 
reward (displayed below the button) delivered probabilistically after a delay. When the 
participant pressed the standard-alternative button, the light bulbs darkened (signaling 
that further button presses had no programmed consequences), the delay interval was 
initiated, after which the reward was either available (p = .35) or the next trial began with 
the illumination of the light bulbs. When a reward was available, the bank icon button 
was illuminated; clicking this button once added $0.30 to the earnings display.  
The right button is referred to as the adjusting alternative because the amount 
available for pressing this button was adjusted between trials dependent on the 
participant’s choices. Pressing the adjusting-alternative button illuminated the bank icon 
immediately (p = 1.0). Pressing the bank icon added the adjusting amount of money 
(displayed below the right button) to the earnings display. This sequence of events was 
programmed to operate exactly as described by Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004).  
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Figure 2. Screen shot of the Experiential Discounting Task.  
After the practice trials the experimenter provided a final opportunity for the 
participant to ask questions and then left the room until the EDT was completed. The 
EDT was composed of 4 trial-blocks, each arranging a different delay to the standard-
alternative (0, 7, 14, or 28 seconds); delays were completed in ascending order.  
Each trial-block included a minimum of 16 choice trials. Following each trial the 
monetary amount displayed below the adjusting-alternative was increased (decreased) if 
the participant selected the standard (adjusting) alternative on the preceding trial. The 
amount of the adjustment was initially 15% of the $0.15 adjusting amount ($0.0225; 
rounded to the nearest penny on the visual display). If the same alternative was chosen on 
two consecutive trials the amount of the adjustment decreased by 2% (13% of $0.15; 
$0.0195). If the participant then chose the previously dis-preferred alternative, the 
adjustment increased by 2% until the adjusted amount returned to $0.15 (and adjustment 
percentage to 15%). In this way, the adjusting amount adjusted symmetrically away from, 
and back to, the original $0.15. Figure 3 displays how the adjusting amount changes 
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given SS (negative x-axis values) or LL (positive x-axis values) choice for any point in 
the session (any value of the SS). In addition, Figure 3 shows that if the participant 
exclusively selects the LL throughout the session the SS amount increases by a 
decreasing percentage following each successive choice (producing a positively 
decelerating function to the right of 0 on the x-axis). Conversely, if exclusive SS 
preference is demonstrated, the amount of the SS decreases by a decreasing percentage 
(producing a negatively decelerating function to the left of 0 on the x-axis). If one 
alternative was selected four consecutive times, participants were forced to select the dis-
preferred alternative (i.e., only one choice button was presented). The adjusting amount 
in the EDT was titrated following forced choices (based on the EDT program provided by 
Reynolds’ lab).  
This titration procedure was designed to find a stable point of indifference 
between the adjusting (SS) and standard (LL) amounts. Stability was evaluated following 
trial 16 and after each subsequent free choice. Stability was defined as three of the 
previous six free choices were for the standard alternative. When stability was achieved 
all buttons were darkened for the remainder of the programmed trial-block duration. The 
duration of each trial block was equal to the delay to the standard alternative (e.g., 30 s) 
times 20 (e.g., 600 s). The timer controlling trial-block duration elapsed only during 
delays to the standard alternative. If the participant reached stability before making 20 LL 
choices, they spent the remainder of the time with the buttons darkened (signally that no 
options were available). If participants made 20 or more LL choices, trial blocks were 
terminated immediately. After each trial block a message informed participants how 
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much they earned in that trial block and required them to press ―OK‖ to continue. 
Following the last trial block (including time-out period) an on-screen message showed 
the amount earned in each trial block, the total amount earned in the session, and a 
message to alert the researcher that the session was over. 
Delay and Probability Discounting Task (DDT/PDT). The discounting task 
replicated the procedures used by Richards et al. (1999; see also Baker, Johnson, & 
Bickel, 2003). This was the most commonly used procedure in studies comparing EDT, 
DDT, and PDT performance, as well as the task used when a positive relation was found 
between EDT and DDT performance (e.g., Acheson et al., 2006, 2007; Melanko, Leraas, 
Collins, Fields, & Reynolds, 2009; Paloyelis et al., 2010; Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds, et 
al., 2006, 2008). Before the task began the experimenter read aloud the on-screen 
instructions and answered participant questions (Appendix C). The participant was then 
left alone to complete the task. On each trial, the participant chose one of two alternatives 
presented on the computer screen. On DDT trials, the standard alternative was described 
as $10 to be delivered after a delay (1 day, 2 days, 1 month, 6 months and 1 year). On 
PDT trials, the standard alternative was described as $10 delivered probabilistically (for 
sure, 90%, 75%, 50% or 25%). The standard alternative was presented on the left side of 
the screen on all trials. DDT and PDT trials were presented randomly and trials were 
separated by one second.  
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Figure 3. Plot of the changing SS amount as a function of choice. Movement right along 
the x-axis depicts LL choices and movement left indicates SS choices. Note that due to 
the adjusting algorithm a participant can move left or right along the curve in any way. 
The limits of the x-axis denote when the trial-block is ended due to the SS amount 
reaching $0.30 or $0.00. The horizontal line at .105 is the expected value of the LL 
amount (.30 × .35). The dashed line is the obtained SS amount given forced choices. The 
solid line is the best-fitting sigmoidal function.  
The amount of the adjusting alternative (SS or smaller-certain reward) was 
displayed in $0.50 increments. On any given trial the amount of the adjusting alternative 
was randomly chosen from a range of values. The upper and lower limits of this range 
were adjusted between trials. Four limits (2 upper and 2 lower) were used in this ―double-
limit‖ procedure. The maximum-upper limit and minimum-upper limit began at $10. The 
maximum-lower limit and minimum-lower limits began at $0. Thereafter, at a particular 
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delay (probability) the limits were adjusted, based on participant choices, according to the 
following rules:  
1. If the standard alternative was chosen: 
a. If the SS was greater than the minimum-upper limit, then this limit 
was set equal to the SS, and the maximum-upper limit was reset to $10 
(this choice is inconsistent with a previous choice). 
b. If the SS was greater than the minimum-lower limit and less than the 
minimum-upper limit, the minimum-lower limit was set equal to the 
SS and the maximum-lower limit was set equal to the previous 
minimum-lower limit (all other values were unchanged).  
c. If the SS was less than the minimum-lower limit, then the maximum-
lower limit was set equal to the SS amount.  
2. If the SS alternative was chosen: 
a. If the SS was greater than the minimum-upper limit, then the 
maximum-upper limit was set to the SS amount.  
b. If the SS was less than the minimum-upper limit and greater than the 
minimum-lower limit, then the minimum-upper limit was set equal to 
the SS amount and the maximum-upper limit was set to the previous 
minimum-upper limit (all other values remained unchanged). 
c. If the SS was less than the minimum-lower limit, then the minimum-
lower limit was set equal to the SS amount and the maximum-lower 
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limit is reset to $0.00 (this choice is inconsistent with a previous 
choice).  
The limits (for each delay and probability) adjusted until the maximum-upper and 
maximum-lower limits (the two extremes) were within $0.50, the average of which was 
then taken as the indifference point. When an indifference point had been determined at a 
given delay (or probability), choices were no longer presented from that delay (or 
probability). In order to disguise the adjustment algorithm, after 70 choices were made 
half of the questions were distractor questions. Distractor questions consisted of 
randomly chosen amounts, delays or probabilities and did not affect indifference points.  
Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS). The BPS is a 28-item true/false questionnaire 
that measures propensity toward boredom and need for stimulation (Farmer & Sundberg, 
1986; Appendix D). The BPS has good internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
(Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Watt & Davis, 1991). We used a 7-point Likert-scaled 
version of the BPS as this increases the sensitivity of the scale without loss of reliability 
(Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; Watt & Blanchard, 1994; Watt & Ewing, 1996). Vodanovich 
and Kass reported that BPS items clustered into 5 factors (see Table 5): external 
stimulation (the environment lacks variety), internal stimulation (the inability to entertain 
oneself produces boredom), perception of time (boredom occurs because time is 
perceived to pass slowly), constraint (the inability to do what one wishes, or the 
obligation to do something one does not wish to do), and affective responses (emotional 
responses to the environment).  
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Table 5 
Factors of the Boredom Proneness Scale 
 
Factor    Items 
 
External Stimulation  6, 19-21, 25-28 
Internal Stimulation  7, 8, 11, 13, 18, 22-24 
Perception of time  3, 4, 14, 16 
Constraint   15, 17 
Affective Responses  2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12 
Monetary Motivation Scale (MMS). The MMS is a 2-item paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire designed to assess participants’ current motivation to earn small amounts of 
money (see Appendix E).  
Data Analysis 
The indifference point for each trial block in the EDT was the average adjusting 
amount over the last six choices. Indifference points from all trial blocks of the EDT were 
normalized by dividing by the indifference point in the 0-s delay block (Reynolds & 
Schiffbauer, 2004). For the DDT and PDT, indifference points were the average of the 
maximum-upper limit and maximum-lower limit from each delay and probability value 
and then divided by $10 to express as a proportion of the standard alternative. 
Normalized and proportional indifference points were then fit with Equation 1 to 
determine best-fitting k-values for individual participants in each task. In addition, the 
area under the empirically determined indifference points was calculated for individual 
participants (AUC; Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). AUC is a theory-free 
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method of quantifying rate of delay discounting and can range from 0 (strict preference 
for smaller rewards) to 1 (rewards are not devalued regardless of delay).  
Several dependent measures deviated significantly from normality. Logarithmic 
and square root transformations failed to improve the distribution for a majority of the 
dependent measures. Therefore nonparametric difference tests were used.  
Test-retest Reliability. Correlational analyses were conducted between all 
dependent measures (between sessions) using either Pearson or Spearman’s correlation. 
Pearson’s r was used unless the distribution of scores violated homoscedasticity, in which 
case Spearman’s ρ was calculated. Correlation coefficients are the recommended method 
for analyzing test-retest data, with follow-up tests to assess systematic variation that 
cannot be detected by correlations (Rousson, Gasser, & Burkhardt, 2002). Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests were conducted to test for differences in performance between sessions 
one and two for all dependent measures as well as Cohen’s d, a measure of effect size 
that expresses mean-differences in standard deviation units. Analyses were conducted 
using GraphPad software (Ver. 5.01) and SPSS 19. 
Between-Measure Correlations. Summed BPS scores, separate BPS factor 
scores, and summed MMS scores were correlated with the discounting measures 
produced by the EDT, DDT, and PDT. Pearson’s r was calculated except when there 
were significant violations of homoscedasticity in which case Spearman’s ρ was 
calculated. For the MMS, items were quantified as distance from the left (in centimeters), 
with a lower bound of .01 and upper bound of 16.1. Item 2 was reverse coded, then 
averaged with item 1.  
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Experiment 2: Inter-Trial Interval 
Participants 
 Twenty undergraduate students and community members (15 female) participated 
in Experiment 2 (M = 21.8 years, SD = 3). As in Experiment 1, participants were 
recruited via an online recruiting website (SONA). Participants signed up for one 90 
minute session and were informed they would be compensated $15-$40 in cash at the 
conclusion of the session (amount dependent on performance). All procedures and 
recruitment materials were approved by the Utah State University IRB.  
Procedure 
 The procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that 
participants also completed a modified version of the EDT (EDTmod). The EDTmod was 
identical to the EDT except that an ITI was imposed following trials on which the 
adjusting alternative (SS reward) was selected. The duration of the ITI was equal to the 
duration of the delay interval experienced after choosing the standard alternative. The ITI 
ensured that the time between choice opportunities was constant within a trial block, 
regardless of the alternative chosen. The ITIs imposed in the EDTmod took the place of 
the period of time during which participants were not allowed to make any responses at 
the conclusion of each trial block. The order of EDT and EDTmod was counterbalanced 
across participants. Between EDT tasks, participants completed the DDT/PDT, BPS and 
MMS (in that order).  
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Data Analysis 
 All data were analyzed as in Experiment 1 with the exception of a second 
session’s data for the DDT/PDT, MMS and BPS. All analyses were conducted using 
GraphPad software (Ver. 5.01) and SPSS 19 as in Experiment 1.   
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Experiment 1: Test-Retest Reliability 
Two participants did not complete the second session and data from one 
participant was lost due to computer malfunction. Therefore data are reported for 16 
individuals. Table 6 shows individual participant’s k and R2 values obtained when 
indifference points were fit with Equation 1. Median individual fits for the DDT and PDT 
were greater than EDT fits (.84 and .94 compared to .49). A Friedman’s test comparing 
R
2
 values across tasks revealed a significant main effect (χ2(3)) = 35.08, p < .0001). 
Dunn’s multiple comparison analysis revealed significant differences in R2 values 
between the EDT and PDT (p < .05), and DDT and PDT (p < .05). The low R
2
 values in 
the EDT may be an artifact of shallow discounting (i.e., little variance in y to be 
accounted for by x). Inconsistent with this hypothesis, an ANOVA comparing mean 
square error (a measure of the deviation from the best-fitting curve) revealed no 
significant difference across the three tasks or the two sessions (F(5) = 1.307, p = .26). 
That is, the difference in R
2
 values across tasks cannot be due to differences in steepness 
of discounting.  
Test-Retest Reliability   
Individual participants’ data for all dependent measures are shown in Figure 4. As 
shown in Table 7, between-session test-retest correlations were positive and significant 
except for EDT and PDT AUC scores, which achieved only a trend level of significance.  
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Table 6  
 
Individual Best-Fitting k Parameters (and R
2
 Values) From Experiment 1 
 
     EDT          DDT      PDT 
 
ID  Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2 Session 1     Session 2 
 
1 .01 (-)  .01 (.68) 18 (.94) 41 (.97) .36 (.97)        .27 (.98) 
2 .04 (.19) 0 (0)  88 (.46) 37 (.91) 1.2 (.84)        1.1 (.65) 
3 .01 (-)  .59 (.42) .52 (.30) .33 (.72) .21 (.99)        1.1 (.89) 
4  .52 (.46) .06 (.01) 24 (-)  45 (.91) .26 (.99)        .81 (.82) 
5 .17 (.85) .03 (.66) .43 (.14) 1.6 (.95) .65 (.99)        .89 (.89) 
6 1.5 (.11) .63 (-)  11457 (0) 11457 (0) 3602 (.99) 23520(.96) 
7 .01 (.92) .51 (.52) 2.0 (.43) .80 (-)  1.2 (.91)        .77 (.68) 
8 2.1 (.95) 2.0 (.94) .15 (-)  .17 (.73) 1.6 (.94)        .70 (.77) 
9 .48 (.95) 1.0 (.21) 2.3 (.98) 6.5 (.89) 1.2 (.90)        3.2 (.77) 
10 1.5 (.52) 1.3 (.17) 43 (.93) 49 (.95) 3.5 (.81)        .16 (.96) 
11 .12 (.22) .62 (.10) 3.1 (.97) 1.3 (.69) .13 (.99)        .10 (.99) 
12 3.2 (.99) .74 (.79) .39 (.23) 3.8 (.97) .10 (.99)        .26 (.98) 
13 .34 (.63) .09 (.29) 1.2 (.19) .15 (.82) .17 (.90)        2.7 (.93) 
14 .47 (.98) .55 (.90) .45 (.92) .51 (.97) 2.2 (.69)        4.2 (.67) 
15 .13 (-)  .04 (-)  .51 (-)  .32 (-)  1.7 (.90)        .46 (.96) 
16 .05 (.70) .09 (-)  .03 (0)  .57 (.49) 1.3 (.93)        .64 (.95) 
17 .13 (-)  -.47 (-)  .17 (.10) .08 (.14) .34 (.78)        .22 (.96) 
18 .11 (.06) 3.2 (.93) .79 (.89) 1.1 (.94) 1.1 (.95)        .60 (.98) 
19 .13 (.57) -.07 (-)  .46 (.77) 1.2 (.93) .54 (.95)        .43 (.95) 
20 .19 (.38) .22 (-)  2.6 (.87) 3.1 (-)  .42 (.85)        .63 (.81) 
21 .83 (.87) 1.1 (.99) .59 (.87) .15 (.82) .44 (.97)        1.4 (.92) 
22 .58 (.54) .74 (.53) 23 (.98) 38 (.93) .56 (.98)        .74 (.98) 
23 .10 (-)  .24 (.54) 33 (.97) 31 (.97) 20 (.87)        7.0 (.74) 
24 .28 (.80) .05 (-)  .39 (-)  .40 (.93) .20 (.95)        .09 (.97) 
25 5.0 (.88) 4.0 (.87) 6.0 (.97) 13 (.98) .98 (.91)        1.4 (.94) 
26 .40 (.80) -.01 (-)  1.3 (.97) .58 (.92) .46 (.97)        .83 (.83) 
 
Median: .2617 (.49)   1.271 (.84)   .7532 (.94) 
 
Note. R
2
 values of 0 or marked as (-) were treated the same (as zeros), and this did not 
affect medians nor Freidman’s test.  
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Table 7 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests and Correlation Coefficients for Between Session 
Differences in Experiment 1 
 
       Rank differences               Correlation 
Session 1 Session 2  
    M (SD)   M (SD)  W   p   d     ρ/r   p 
 
EDT (AUC) .82 (.19) .88 (.26) -117 .14 .27  .32 .06 
EDT k  .70 (1.1) .65 (.97) 51 .52 -.05  .66 <.01 
DDT (AUC) .56 (.29) .53 (.33) 43 .57 -.10  .86   <.01 
DDT k  459 (2244) 467 (2243) -89 .23 .004     .78 <.01  
PDT (AUC) .41 (.13) .47 (.15) -143 .07 .41  .38 .06 
PDT k  140 (706) 910 (4632) -49 .54 .29  .52 <.01 
BPS  94 (19) 94 (17) 4 .96 .02  .89 <.01 
MMS  9.3 (4.8) 8.2 (4.3) 141 .06 -.24  .73  <.01 
 
Note. n = 26. Bold indicates that Spearman’s ρ was used.  
 
In addition, the Wilcoxon’s rank differences tests revealed no statistically significant 
differences between matched pairs (i.e., across sessions) for any dependent measures, 
indicating no systematic change in performance across sessions.  
As seen in Table 6, 14 of the 52 EDT R
2
 values were < 0, meaning that a 
horizontal line at the mean of the indifference points accounts for as much as, or more, of 
the variance than the hyperbolic model. Given this, AUC may be more appropriate for 
assessing test-retest reliability; however, a limitation of AUC, as described by Myerson et 
al. (2001) is that the same AUC can be generated from potentially very different patterns 
of indifference points.  
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Figure 5. Median normalized indifference points from the Experiential Discounting Task 
in Experiment 1. Error bars depict standard error of the mean (n = 29).  
For these reasons, we tested for time effects on normalized or proportional indifference 
points using a 2 (session) by 4 (indifference point) repeated measures ANOVA. The 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction on degrees of freedom was used when there were 
violations of sphericity. Figure 5 shows normalized indifference points as a function of 
delay in the two EDT sessions. There was a significant main effect of delay (F(2.029) = 
7.8, p < .001), no main effect of session (F(1) = 1.391, p = .249), and no session by delay 
interaction (F(3) = 1.1, p = .352). Delay and probability task indifference points are 
shown in Figure 6. For the DDT there was a significant main effect of delay (F(1.605) = 
.89, p < .001), no main effect of session (F(1) = .989, p = .33), and no interaction 
(F(2.698) = .89, p = .44). For PDT there was a main effect of probability (F(2.2) = 
180.346, p < .001) no main effect of session (F(1) = 2.067, p = .163), but there was a 
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marginally significant interaction (F(4) = 2.609, p = .056). Though there was a 
marginally significant interaction, θ-values did not differ significantly between sessions 
(W = -49, p = .54).  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Delay (top) and probability discounting group median indifference functions in 
Experiment 1. Error bars depict standard error of the mean.  
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Covariance of Dependent Measures 
 As no statistically significant differences were detected across sessions, data were 
averaged across sessions for the remaining analyses. Table 8 shows the correlation matrix 
among AUC values generated by the EDT, DDT, and PDT; it also shows correlations 
between these measures and the BPS and MMS. The only significant correlation was a 
positive relation between DDT and PDT AUC values. Thus, those who steeply 
discounted delayed rewards also tended to be risk averse. Importantly, AUC from the 
EDT and DDT were not significantly correlated, suggesting that the two tasks measure 
different processes.  
Table 8 
 Correlation Matrix for Dependent Measures in Experiment 1  
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5  M SD  
 
1. EDT AUC 1        .85 .19 
2. DDT AUC .01 1       .55 .29 
3. PDT AUC .21 .41* 1     .44 .12  
4. BPS  -.01 -.08 .19 1   94 17  
5. MMS  -.34 .39 -.09 .13 1  8.7 4.2    
   
Note. n = 26. Because differences between sessions were not detected, data for each 
dependent measure were averaged across sessions. Bold indicates Spearman’s ρ was 
used. * p < .05.  
 
Experiment 2: Inter-Trial Interval 
 Table 9 shows k- and R
2
 values for individual participants across the four tasks in 
Experiment 2. Friedman’s test revealed no significant difference across tasks despite the 
range of median values (.44 for EDTmod to .88 for PDT; Table 9; χ2(3)) = 0.33, p =.85).  
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In addition, no differences in deviation from the hyperbolic curve were detected (mean 
square error; F(3) = .3382, p = .80). 
 The primary question of Experiment 2 was whether the addition of an ITI would 
systematically affect choice. The median of all participants’ indifference points for the 
EDT and EDTmod are shown in Figure 7. A matched-pairs t test revealed no significant 
effect of adding an ITI regardless of whether AUC or k-value was used to quantify 
discounting (t = .86, p = .40; t = .97, p = .34, respectively). A 2 (task) by 4 (delay) 
repeated measures ANOVA using individual indifference points revealed no main effect 
of delay (F(3) = 1.641, p = .19), task (F(1) = .526, p = .477) nor interaction (F(3) = .646, 
p = .588). 
As in Experiment 1, correlation coefficients were calculated using either 
Pearson’s r or Spearman’s ρ and these are reported in Table 10. The correlations between 
discounting measures across the two EDT tasks were not statistically significant. Upon 
further examination of the data there was one outlier, with an AUC value from the EDT 
session of 1.68 and only .78 in the EDTmod. AUC values exceeding 1 are possible in the 
EDT because indifference points are normalized to the indifference point obtained in the 
first trial block (0-s delay). If indifference points in subsequent trial blocks exceed this 
first indifference point, AUC may be > 1. Excluding this participant produced a strong, 
positive correlation between EDT tasks regardless of the way in which discounting was 
quantified (AUC r = .74, p < .01; k-value r = .90, p < .01). The BPS was negatively 
correlated with EDT AUC indicating that individuals who are less prone to boredom 
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discount less steeply in the EDT. The MMS did not significantly correlate with any 
dependent measure.  
 
Table 9  
Individual Best-Fitting k Parameters (and R
2
 Values) From Experiment 2 
ID     EDT    
   
      EDTmod         DDT  
  
     PDT   
     
1 .28 (.01)  .13 (.21)  257 (.96)  8.0 (.80) 
2 -.01 (.88)  .05 (-)   .62 (.59)  10 (-) 
3 .93 (.51)  .59 (.79)  .61 (.47)  5.1 (.93) 
4 -.04 (.08)  .14 (.94)  2.0 (.60)  2.2 (.99) 
5 .39 (.07)  .55 (.78)  6.1 (.97)  1.6 (.69) 
6 .05 (.70)  .25 (.83)  .54 (.73)  4.0 (.97) 
7 .06 (.11)  .16 (.78)  .47 (-)   .83 (.62) 
8 -.73 (.93)  .41 (-)   152 (.96)  48 (.99) 
9 .26 (.54)  .06 (.69)  .44 (.49)  .74 (-) 
10 .47 (.68)  .13 (.35)  .36 (.91)  3.838 (.98) 
11 0 (0)   0 (0)   .30 (.15)  1.7 (.84) 
12 .80 (.94)  .20 (-)   10 (.94)  1.6 (.93) 
13 .16 (.84)  -.01 (-)   57 (.51)  2.2 (.69) 
14 .05 (.52)  .32 (.57)  6.0 (.87)  1.2 (.92) 
15 .22 (.64)  .53 (.87)  .22 (.21)  7.5 (.99) 
16 .32 (.86)  .21 (.53)  6.3 (-)   3.8 (.72) 
17 0 (0)   0 (0)   .03 (0)   4.8 (.94) 
18 -.07 (.26)  .13 (-)   .03 (0)   .08 (.75) 
19 14 (.98)  1.8 (.88)  .03 (0)   12 (.90) 
20 .97 (.11)  -.16 (-)   39 (.95)  5.0 (.85) 
 
Median: .14 (.59)  .15 (.44)  .59 (.59)  3.8 (.88) 
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Figure 7. Median normalized indifference points from the EDT in Experiment 2. Error 
bars depict standard error of the mean (n = 20).  
Table 10  
 
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Measures in Experiment 2  
   
1 2 3 4 5 6  M SD  
 
1. EDT auc  1       .92 .25 
2. EDTmod  .33 1      90 .12 
3. DDT auc -.34  -.10 1     .61 .32 
4. PDT auc -.18  .19 .27 1    .49 .20 
5. BPS  -.45*   -.29 .07 .37 1   82 16 
6. MMS  -.28 .13 .22 .34 -.23 1  8.7 5.0 
 
Note. n = 20. Only AUC values were used for the discounting assessments. Bold 
indicates Spearman’s ρ was used. * p < .05. 
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Combined Analyses 
Because several of the tasks were identical in both experiments a number of 
questions can be addressed using the data from both experiments. Four overall 
correlations are of interest: the correlation between discounting as assessed by the EDT 
and DDT, how both of these correlate with probability discounting, and how the 0-second 
indifference points on the EDT (a putative measure of sensitivity to probability) correlate 
with probability discounting. Figure 8 shows the absence of a correlation between AUC 
values obtained in the EDT and DDT across both experiments (ρ = .01, p = .94).  
We combined the delay and probability discounting data from both experiments 
(averaging the values across sessions in Experiment 1). Figure 9 shows that there was a 
significant positive correlation between AUC across these two tasks (r = .33, p < .05). 
Figure 10 shows that there was no significant correlation between EDT and probability 
discounting. Note that there were two participants excluded from this analysis based on a 
z-scores greater than 3 (one for EDT AUC, and the other for PDT AUC).  
One assumption of the EDT is that the indifference point in the 0-second delay 
block is a measure of sensitivity to probability (because the delayed option is 
probabilistic). In order to test this assumption, in Figure 11 we assessed the correlation 
between the 0-second indifference point in the EDT with AUC from the PDT. Figure 11 
reveals a significant positive correlation. Note one participant was excluded as an outlier 
(z-score >3) based on PDT AUC.  
 
43 
 
 
Figure 8. Correlation between delay discounting and experiential discounting area under 
the curve. Dotted line depicts the best-fitting regression line (n = 46).  
Finally, we examined correlations between the three discounting assessments and 
the five factors of the BPS (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990). There were no significant 
relations between the discounting measures and the BPS items (Table 11).  
 
Figure 9. Correlation between delay discounting and probability discounting area under 
the curve. Dotted line depicts the best-fitting regression line (n = 46). 
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Figure 10. Correlation between experiential discounting and probability discounting area 
under the curve. Dotted line depicts the best-fitting regression line (n = 44).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Correlation between probability discounting AUC and the 0-second 
indifference point from the EDT. Indifference points were used from Experiments 1 and 
2; Session 1 in Experiment 1 and the EDT from Experiment 2. Dotted line depicts the 
best-fitting regression line (n = 45).  
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Table 11 
 
Correlations Among BPS Subscales and Experiential, Delay, and Probability 
Discounting  
 
    EDT  DDT  PDT 
   
        
 
 
External Stimulation  -.03  .001 .12 
Internal Stimulation  -.24  .05  -.09 
Perception of Time  -.25  .07  .02 
Constraint   .07  -.06  .001 
Affective Responses  -.25  .04  .09 
 
Note. n = 59 
 
Another Hypothesis 
To further investigate the behavioral processes underlying the EDT, we 
investigated a model that calculates discounted value for rewards that are both 
probabilistic and delayed. Yi et al. (2006) proposed the following equation in which 
probability is included in the hyperbolic equation as a cost variable that combines 
additively with the delay: 
   
 
          
    (2) 
In Equation 2, R is a scaling parameter for the odds against obtaining the delayed reward 
(θ); all other parameters are as in Equation 1. Rachlin et al. (1991) calculated a scaling 
parameter for odds against by having participants make decisions about delayed and 
probabilistic rewards. In their experiments with human subjects, an R of 35.3 provided 
the best between-subjects fit. We used this R-value and Equation 2 to fit non-normalized 
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EDT indifference points (data were non-normalized because reward probability was now 
included in the discounting equation). At this value of R, Equation 2 provided poor fits 
(median R
2
 = .18; see the frequency distribution in Figure 12). Next we allowed R to vary 
between participants and, not surprisingly, obtained better fits (as seen in Figure 12).  
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0
5
10
15
20
R unconstrained
R = 35.3
Median
0.6597
0.1806
R-square
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
Figure 12. Distribution of R
2
 values from equation 2 based on various constraints of the 
parameter R. All negative R
2
 values are included in the 0 bin.  
Using this arrangement of free-parameters, the estimates of k and R putatively 
account for individual variation in sensitivity to delay and probability, respectively. With 
sensitivity to reward probability removed from the EDT estimate of delay discounting, 
one would now expect EDT k-values derived from Equation 2 to correlate with AUC 
from the DDT. Figure 13 shows that there was no correlation between the two.  
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Figure 13. Correlation between best-fitting k-values when R was unconstrained and delay 
discounting AUC.  
 
  
ρ = -.06 
p = 0.65 
48 
 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The goals of the present set of experiments were to (a) assess the test-retest 
reliability of the EDT, (b) determine if adding an ITI to the EDT would systematically 
affect choice, and (c) evaluate its validity against a DDT with good test-retest reliability 
and internal validity. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the EDT had good test-retest 
reliability over a period of seven days. Experiment 2 demonstrated that adding an ITI to 
trials in which the SS reward was selected did not affect choices made in the EDT.  
The EDT was developed to provide a measure of delay discounting that addresses 
concerns about more typical procedures used to assess delay discounting in humans; it 
arranges real instead of hypothetical rewards and delays, and estimates discounting from 
a stable pattern of choice. As noted earlier, the real rewards arranged in the EDT are 
different from those arranged in nonhuman experiments because monetary rewards 
cannot be spent (consumed) when delivered. Because previous research with pigeons 
(e.g., Hackenberg & Vaidya, 2003) and people (Hyten et al., 1994) suggests delayed non-
consumable rewards are not discounted over the range of delays arranged in the EDT, it 
is surprising that delay discounting is observed in the EDT.  
The present studies were designed to test one of the procedural concerns 
associated with the EDT—the omission of ITIs. Although not using an ITI allows for 
opportunity costs of choosing the LL that often occur in our everyday lives, it is difficult 
to dissociate the effects produced by opportunity costs versus the effects of the delay. 
However, when we imposed an ITI in Experiment 2 we found no change in performance 
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from the EDT without ITIs. These data suggest that inclusion of opportunity costs 
associated with LL choice is a nonfunctional procedural characteristic of the EDT. Thus, 
it appears that the EDT does not capture the effect of opportunity costs.  
Does the EDT Assess Delay Discounting? 
The present findings reveal (a) DDT and EDT measures of delay discounting 
were uncorrelated; (b) the hyperbolic model (Equation 1) provided poorer fits to EDT 
than DDT indifference points; (c) EDT choice (like DDT choice) does not systematically 
change over a period of 7 days; and (d) when sensitivity to reward probability was 
separated from EDT estimates of k, these estimates were not correlated with the DDT 
assessment of delay discounting. Together with the literature summarized in the 
Introduction, very little evidence supports the EDT as a valid measure of delay 
discounting.  
What Does the EDT Measure? 
Given these findings, what does the EDT measure? Here we will consider four 
possibilities. First, the EDT may provide a measure of sensitivity to opportunity costs. 
Traditional delay discounting tasks use hypothetical rewards and delays which do not 
arrange opportunity costs associated with choosing the delayed reward (i.e., one is free to 
pursue other rewards during the delay). By contrast, in the EDT one is unable to obtain 
the SS alternative for the duration of the delay to the LL reward. In this way, performance 
in the EDT may be determined by one’s sensitivity to opportunity costs. If this is so, then 
EDT performance should not be related to a task that assesses the devaluation of a reward 
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delayed in time (namely a DDT). Perhaps sensitivity to opportunity costs co-varies with 
substance use disorders and may be affected by experimental manipulations such as sleep 
deprivation (e.g., Reynolds & Schiffbeaur, 2004) and alcohol (Reynolds et al., 2006). 
However, if this were the case, then we should have seen a significant difference in EDT 
performance when the ITI was excluded, as in Experiment 2.  
Second, the EDT may measure intolerance for periods devoid of stimulation. In 
the EDT, one can avoid no-stimulation periods by choosing the SS reward. If this were 
the case we would expect BPS scores to negatively correlate with EDT performance. We 
did find a negative relation between overall BPS scores and EDT performance in 
Experiment 2 indicating that this might be a mechanism behind EDT performance. 
However, this relation was not seen when Experiments 1 and 2 were combined. Further 
evidence against this hypothesis is that the internal stimulation subscale of the BPS 
(inability to entertain oneself) was not significantly correlated with EDT scores. More 
data will be needed to further explore this relation.   
Third, the EDT may measure subjective perception of the passage of time. If a 
participant’s internal clock ran quickly, the delay to the LL reward in the EDT (a delay 
actually experienced during the EDT) would be subjectively experienced as longer than 
by a participant with a slower clock. The BPS includes a perception of time subscale, 
which quantifies the extent which boredom occurs because time is perceived as passing 
slowly. However, EDT scores were not correlated with this subscale of the BPS. 
Finally, the EDT might be affected by participant’s ability to discriminate and 
strategically exploit the EDT’s adjusting-amount algorithm used to determine an 
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indifference point (i.e., the internality). In animal adjusting-amount tasks the choice is 
between small amounts of food or liquid, each consumed upon delivery. By contrast, in 
the EDT, money is accumulated, either on screen or in a glass jar, which may facilitate 
discrimination of the algorithm by which the amount of the adjusting alternative changes 
depending on choice. Participants who discriminate this algorithm may be more likely to 
choose the LL reward in an effort to strategically increase the amount of the SS reward. 
This may be followed by a series of choices in which participants ―cash in‖ by repeatedly 
choosing the SS (for sure) reward. Figure 3 depicts the adjusting-amount algorithm by 
plotting the SS amount (dashed line) as a function of choice. Assuming maximization of 
amount, participants should never choose the LL reward when the SS exceeds the 
expected value of the larger alternative; i.e., 11 cents. However we often found 
indifference points between 21 and 25 cents. If LL choices are made to exploit the 
adjusting-amount algorithm and increase the amount of the SS reward, then the slope of 
the curve in Figure 3 depicts the decreasing benefit of each additional LL choice (in 
increasing the SS amount).  
In a procedure designed to test the extent to which individuals exploit an adjusting 
algorithm, Heyman and Dunn (2002) reported that in comparison to matched controls, 
substance abusers did not learn to exploit the internality. Substance abusers may similarly 
not learn to exploit the internality in the EDT causing their performance to be 
significantly different from controls (Fields et al., 2009; Meda et al., 2009; Melanko et 
al., 2009). Similarly acute effects of sleep deprivation or alcohol may dampen an 
individual’s ability to detect and exploit this internality. In order to test this assumption, 
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future research should directly compare EDT performance to performance in a task that is 
designed to specifically test sensitivity to an internality.  
An important further consideration for future research is the experiential nature of 
the EDT. That is, how might choice in the EDT be affected if either the delays, rewards 
or both were not experienced, but were conveyed verbally? Interestingly, there does not 
seem to be a difference in EDT results when the money is delivered via a coin dispenser 
immediately when the reward is earned versus when the amount accumulates on-screen 
and delivered in one lump sum following completion of the session.  
Conclusion 
The EDT is a procedurally complicated task in which choices are made between 
SS and probabilistic LL rewards. Given the numerous potentially interacting procedural 
variables, it is difficult to say what the EDT measures. However, the results of our 
experiments provide very limited evidence supporting the contention that the EDT 
measures delay discounting.  
Because choice in the EDT is sensitive to acute experimental manipulations, 
group differences, and may be predictive of drug-taking, it is important to know what the 
EDT measures. Future research might benefit from systematically asking participants to 
report why they make the choices they make. Such self-reports may provide evidence for 
one of the controlling variables discussed above, or they may suggest a new variable that 
could be experimentally manipulated in future research.  
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APPENDIX A 
Experiential Discounting Task Instructions 
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“This first portion is a practice portion, you will not receive any money from this portion. 
You will receive, in cash, the amount you earn during the portions you complete while I 
am out of the room.” 
a. Point to the left light bulb and say: “This is the delayed option.”  
b. Point to the right light bulb and say: “This is the immediate option.” 
c. Point to the Total Amount Area and say: “This is the amount that you will receive in           
cash.” 
d. Read:  
―You will have the opportunity to make multiple choices between a delayed and 
probabilistic 30 cents or an adjusting immediate and for sure amount of money to 
be deposited into the bank.  
… as you are making choices with this task, the adjusting amount will adjust 
according to certain rules. For every choice to the delayed 30 cents on the left… 
 
e. Point to the left light bulb and continue: 
 “…the adjusting amount on the right… 
 
f. Point to the right light bulb and continue: 
“…will go up in value for the next choice. For every choice to the adjusting 
immediate amount on the right… 
 
g. Point to the right light bulb and continue: 
―...the amount on that side will go down in value for the next choice. There are no 
right or wrong ways to do this task, just do what you prefer. You will be 
completing several portions, all of which will differ in length of time—from short 
to long. Proceed through the portions at your own pace. A box will pop up 
signaling the end of the task. You will know this is the end because it requires a 
password to continue. 
At this point, you will signal for me and I will record how much money you have 
earned in this task.  
 
h. To demonstrate how the program works, run the practice portion, having the 
participant make choices for each option.  
i. point out: The bank button must be clicked when it illuminates and that the 
amount of money on the right side is adjusting based on the previous choice.  
i. Following the completion of the practice session ask the participant if he/she has any 
questions. After any questions have been answered, leave the room until they signal for 
you to return.   
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Answers to Commonly Asked Questions in the EDT 
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Commonly asked questions (with responses in italics): 
 
If the participant does not readily click on the bank button when it illuminates.  
Response: [point to the bank button] You need to click this to deposit the money into your 
bank.  
 
“Why are the buttons not available?” 
Response: Sometimes you just need to wait.  
 
“Is it broken?”  
(at the end during the long waiting period) 
Response: It is working properly, you just have to wait longer sometimes.  
(When only one alternative becomes available) 
Response: Sometimes this happens, you simply have to choose the available one. 
 
Adjusting amount (confusion or misunderstanding) 
Response: (refer to the appropriate sections on the previous page).  
 
“Will I get credit for my psychology course for completing this study?” 
Response: No, the only form of compensation is the cash we will pay you at the end of the 
session. 
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APPENDIX C 
Delay and Probability Discounting Task Instructions 
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In this task you will choose between different amounts of money. 
All of these outcomes are hypothetical (you will not actually receive the money). 
 
Use the computer mouse to make your decisions. 
Please make your decisions as if you were really going to receive the money. 
 
There are no correct or incorrect choices; just make our choices so they reflect what you 
really want. 
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APPENDIX D 
Boredom Proneness Scale 
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Before each statement below please rate the extent to which the statement applies to 
you using the following scale:  
1  2  3       4   5        6  7  
Highly Disagree        Highly Agree 
_____ 1.   It is easy for me to concentrate on my activities. (Reverse) 
_____ 2.   Frequently when I am working I find myself worrying about other things. 
_____ 3.   Time always seems to be passing slowly. 
_____ 4.   I often find myself at "loose ends", not knowing what to do. 
_____ 5.   I am often trapped in situations where I have to do meaningless things. 
_____ 6.   Having to look at someone's home movies or travel slides bores me 
tremendously. 
_____ 7.   I have projects in mind all the time, things to do. (Reverse) 
_____ 8.   I find it easy to entertain myself. (Reverse) 
_____ 9.   Many things I have to do are repetitive and monotonous. 
_____ 10. It takes more stimulation to get me going than most people. 
_____ 11. I get a kick out of most things I do. (Reverse) 
_____ 12. I am seldom excited about my work. 
_____ 13. In any situation I can usually find something to do or see to keep me 
interested. (Reverse) 
_____ 14. Much of the time I just sit around doing nothing. 
_____ 15. I am good at waiting patiently. (Reverse) 
_____ 16. I often find myself with nothing to do, time on my hands. 
_____ 17. In situations where I have to wait, such as a line I get very restless. 
_____ 18. I often wake up with a new idea. (Reverse) 
_____ 19. It would be very hard for me to find a job that is exciting enough. 
_____ 20. I would like more challenging things to do in life. 
_____ 21. I feel that I am working below my abilities most of  the time. 
_____ 22. Many people would say that I am a creative or imaginative person. (Reverse) 
_____ 23. I have so many interests, I don't have time to do everything. (Reverse) 
_____ 24. Among my friends, I am the one who keeps doing something the longest. 
(Reverse) 
_____ 25. Unless I am doing something exciting, even dangerous, I feel half-dead and 
dull.  
_____ 26. It takes a lot of change and variety to keep me really happy. 
_____ 27. It seems that the same things are on television or the movies all the time; it's 
getting old. 
 _____ 28. When I was young, I was often in monotonous and tiresome 
situations. 
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Monetary Motivation Scale 
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